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ABSTRACT
American police do a bit of everything. They direct traffic, resolve
private disputes, help the sick and injured, and do animal control. Far
less frequently than one might think, they make arrests. Americans
reflexively call the police for troubles, big and small. The “catchall
tradition” is shorthand for this melding of non-adversarial, public
assistance with adversarial, crime-control functions. The catchall
tradition means that civilians are exposed to the police’s coercive power
as a condition of receiving police help. This Article contends that the
catchall tradition is antithetical to constitutional police regulation. The
Supreme Court has distinguished adversarial from non-adversarial state
action, often imposing less Fourth Amendment constraint on the latter.
The Court recently reaffirmed this distinction in Caniglia v. Strom. But
the catchall tradition makes it impossible for the police themselves let
alone courts to distinguish between the police’s non-adversarial and
adversarial functions. This is a problem without a doctrinal solution.
The Article thus concludes that meaningful constitutional regulation of
police requires remaking police agencies in a more decisively adversarial
mold.
INTRODUCTION
An entry door left open might lead a police officer at the scene to
wonder about the occupant’s wellbeing.1 If no one responds when the
officer calls, it could be that an occupant is hurt or otherwise needs
help. But what if, upon entering to investigate, the officer discovers
evidence of a crime? What if the officer had planned on searching for
Copyright © 2022 Nirej Sekhon.
† Professor of Law, Georgia State University. Thanks to Russ Covey, Caren Morrison,
Jonathan Todres, and Deepa Varadarajan for comments on earlier versions of this Article.
Thanks also to Chorong Song and Isabel Gao for meticulous editing.
1. See MacDonald v. Eastham, 745 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting that the officer
discovered evidence of crime after entering the opened entry door to check on the occupant’s
welfare); United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1006 (8th Cir. 2006) (same).
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criminal evidence all along? The Fourth Amendment is more
permissive of the police entering a home to help someone who is
injured than it is of the police entering to conduct a criminal search.2
The police might thus cry crocodile tears of worry when they really
hope to search for evidence of a crime but do not have sufficient
suspicion to satisfy the more demanding standard for a criminal search.
Fourth Amendment scholars have noted the problem of “pretext,”3 but
they often overlook how the structure and tradition of American
policing make pretextual behavior inevitable and virtually
undetectable.
The “catchall tradition” has long defined American policing. 4
Police direct traffic, resolve private disputes, help the sick and injured,
do animal control, and far less frequently than one might think, they
make arrests. 5 Melding non-adversarial, public assistance with
adversarial, crime-control functions means that police assistance
inevitably comes with the possibility of harsh treatment associated with
their latter function. The consequences can be tragic: a 911 call for help
with a friend’s or family member’s mental health crisis could end with
police using lethal force.6
2. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
does not require a finding of probable cause when it is reasonable to think someone is injured or
about to be injured ).
3. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Police as Community Caretakers: Caniglia v. Strom,
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 191, 207–08 (2020–21) (summarizing legal approaches to pretext); Gabriel J.
Chin & Charles Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and the Radical
Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 916–17, 918–23 (2015)
(arguing that United States v. Whren was incorrectly decided and summarizing the literature on
the same).
4. See ROBERT FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 108 (1978) (describing the catchall
tradition’s persistence in the United States).
5. Criminologists have long recognized this point. See DAVID E. BARLOW & MELISSA
HICKMAN BARLOW, POLICE IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 14 (2000) (noting the time study
showing that patrol officers spent less than 15% of their shifts engaged in traditional crime control
activities); PETER K. MANNING, POLICE WORK 26 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that the police work, in
the main, is not “criminal law relevant, but represents various kinds of public and private
troubles . . . .”); John Van Maanen, Working the Street: A Developmental View of Police Behavior
42–43 (Mass. Inst. of Tech., Working Paper No. 681-73, 1973) (stating that patrol officers devote
“little of [their] time on the street” to traditional crime control activities). Law scholars are
increasingly paying attention to this fact and its legal implications. See Barry Friedman,
Disaggregating the Police Function, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 950–54 (2021) (noting how little time
patrol officers devote to crime control).
6. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 3, at 195–96 (noting cases of people killed by police during
mental-health-related calls for service); Jamelia Morgan, Policing Under Disability Law, 73 STAN.
L. REV. 1401, 1415–16 (2021) (describing a case where a husband requested help with his spouse);
Justin Garcia, Las Cruces Police Shoot and Kill Dog During Welfare Check, LAS CRUCES SUN-
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This Article contends that the catchall tradition is antithetical to
constitutional police regulation. The catchall tradition makes it
impossible for officers themselves, let alone courts to readily and
consistently distinguish between non-adversarial and adversarial tasks.
The Supreme Court has nonetheless distinguished adversarial from
non-adversarial state action, often imposing less Fourth Amendment
constraints on the latter.7 This recognizes that, in theory, individuals
need more protection against the State when it is trying to harm rather
than help them. The Court developed this intuition in Fourth
Amendment cases involving non-adversarial state institutions like
firefighters, public schools, and welfare caseworkers.8 The police are
no less significant purveyors of non-adversarial services than these
institutions, but they do so in the shadow of their coercive and
adversarial power.
Accommodating the police’s non-adversarial roles is more of an
afterthought in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 9 but a recurring
one that highlights courts’ limited ability to decipher the sometimes
inscrutable ambiguities of the police’s motivations. The Fourth
Amendment canon has developed primarily in cases of adversarial
policing: searches and seizures that support criminal charges.10 There
are fewer opinions addressing the police’s non-adversarial functions.
But in the cases that do exist, the Court often relaxes Fourth
Amendment standards for ostensibly non-adversarial police

NEWS (June 29, 2021), https://www.lcsun-news.com/story/news/crime/2021/06/29/las-crucespolice-shoot-kill-dog-during-welfare-check/7791184002 [https://perma.cc/8YYC-9GSV] (noting
that police shot a pet while responding to the mental health call); Jonathan Levinson, Man Killed
by Portland Police Called 911 Himself, Seeking Mental Health Care, OREGON PUB. BROAD. (June
28, 2021), https://www.opb.org/article/2021/06/28/man-killed-by-portland-police-called-911himself-seeking-mental-health-care [https://perma.cc/T8G9-GY8B] (reporting that the police
shot an individual during a welfare check); Minyvonne Burke, Policing mental health: Recent
deaths highlight concerns over officer response, NBC NEWS (May 16, 2021),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/policing-mental-health-recent-deaths-highlightconcerns-over-officer-response-n1266935 [https://perma.cc/LZ2B-NRMM] (same); Madeline
McGee & Alaa Elasar, Police Mental Health Training Under Scrutiny in Fatal North Fulton
Shooting, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/crime—law/familysomali-refugee-killed-police-suffered-from-mental-illness/wANMDpfDATXvVqqI75JdaI
[https://perma.cc/G93Q-XEWW] (same).
7. See, e.g., Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403; Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)
(noting the role of the police in implementing “the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and
traffic”).
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part I.A.
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functions.11 For example, the Court permits police to forcibly enter a
home “to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant” on a
lesser showing than required to enter in search of criminal evidence.12
In theory, it makes sense that the police would have a greater
constitutional berth to help someone out of a jam than to lock them up.
But the distinction between non-adversarial and adversarial roles is
often less clearly etched in practice than in theory. The facts in the
recent Supreme Court case of Caniglia v. Strom are illustrative.
Caniglia arose from a police welfare check prompted by Caniglia’s
wife’s 911 call. She reported that Caniglia had threatened to harm
himself during an argument with her the previous evening and that he
was presently armed.13 In the course of the police’s welfare check on
Caniglia, he agreed to submit to psychiatric evaluation at a local
hospital. After his departure, however, the police searched Caniglia’s
home and seized his firearms.14 The police did not have a warrant to
enter Caniglia’s home let alone to seize his firearms.15 The search and
seizure were carried out in the name of helping Caniglia but were
clearly adversarial acts to which he did not consent.
The First Circuit upheld the police search and seizure under the
rubric of “community caretaking,” reasoning that police have “wide
latitude” to perform non-adversarial functions and “need only act
‘within the realm of reason.’”16
The Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit,17 but did so in a way
that underscored the constitutional awkwardness of reconciling the
police’s adversarial and non-adversarial roles. The Court announced
that there is no “freestanding community caretaking” exception that
relieves the police of having to obtain a search warrant to enter a home
as ordinarily required in criminal cases.18 But the Court also reaffirmed
its earlier decision in Brigham City v. Stuart which permitted police to

11. See infra notes 41–65 and accompanying discussion.
12. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403.
13. Caniglia v. Strom, 396 F. Supp. 3d 227, 231 (D.R.I. 2019).
14. Id. at 231–32.
15. Id. at 231.
16. Caniglia v. Strom, 953 F.3d 112, 123 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. RodriguezMorales, 929 F.2d 780, 786 (1991)).
17. Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 1599 (2021).
18. Id. at 3.
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enter a home without a warrant or probable cause to offer emergency
assistance to someone inside.19
Four justices concurred separately in Caniglia to underscore that
even if the First Circuit had gotten carried away in giving the police
wide latitude to help the sick and injured, Caniglia should not be read
as an overcorrection. 20 The concurring Justices seemed to offer
assurance that the Court would continue to look upon the police
differently depending on whether they are performing ostensibly
adversarial or non-adversarial acts.21
Distinguishing between the police’s adversarial and nonadversarial functions might make sense as a theory under the Fourth
Amendment, but the catchall tradition frustrates its practical
application. The unsystematic intermingling of adversarial and nonadversarial functions in American policing defies post hoc judicial
analysis. The catchall traditional makes it difficult, if not impossible,
for the police themselves to contemporaneously distinguish between
adversarial and non-adversarial action. It should be no surprise then
that courts are unable to readily do so after the fact. 22 Civilians
parceling adversarial and non-adversarial functions between
institutions is a prerequisite for meaningful judicial enforcement of the
distinction. The catchall tradition ensures that civilians are exposed to
19. During the oral argument, there was confusion about the nomenclature — namely
whether “community caretaking” was more permissive than the so-called “emergency assistance”
exception. Transcript of Oral Argument at 66–67, 76–79, Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596 (2021).
Both pertain to the police’s authority to perform non-criminal functions, but the former was
announced in the context of a vehicle search, while the latter was announced in the context of a
home entry. See id.
20. Justices Roberts and Breyer emphasized that Brigham City remained good law.
Caniglia, 141 S. Ct. at 1600 (Roberts, J. concurring). Justice Alito emphasized that Caniglia should
not be read to mean searches and seizures conducted for non-crime control purposes are
subjected to the same limitations as those conducted for crime control purposes. Id. at 1600–02
(Alito, J. concurring). Justice Kavanaugh made a similar point by noting that forcible police
entries are critical for suicide prevention and rescuing injured seniors. Id. at 1602–05 (Kavanaugh,
J. concurring).
21. But see Slobogin, supra note 3, at 194. Professor Slobogin expresses hope that Caniglia
might lead the Court to “rethink[ ]” the Fourth Amendment’s carve-out for the so-called “special
needs” and other non-criminal police functions. Id. This hope seems unlikely to be realized given
the narrowness of the Court’s holding in Caniglia, id. at 193, and in light of the views expressed
by the concurring Justices. See supra note 20. In addition, the “special needs” cases are embedded
in a broader, entrenched set of jurisprudential intuitions about non-adversarial police functions.
See infra Part II.B.
22. The Supreme Court has noted the difficulty of parsing officers’ subjective motivations
after the fact. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814–15 (1996) (identifying as a difficulty
that “police enforcement practices, even if they could be practicably assessed by a judge, vary
from place to place and from time to time”).
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the State’s coercive power as a condition of receiving its help. This is
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s spirit that a citizen enjoys
the right to be “let alone.”23 Indiscriminately bundling adversarial and
non-adversarial functions is not just bad policy,24 this Article argues
that it offends constitutional principle.
The Article proceeds in three parts. First, it shows how the Fourth
Amendment canon arose in the context of adversarial state action —
namely, the police investigating crime. Next, this Article describes how
cases involving non-adversarial institutions inspired exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment that were also applied to the police. It then
explains how the catchall tradition makes it difficult to distinguish
between the police’s adversarial and non-adversarial functions. The
Article concludes by identifying the implications of the analysis for
policymakers.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CANON
The Fourth Amendment applies to all state actors, but the canon
casts the police as first among equals. 25 This illustrates the unique
dangers of the police’s adversarial posture when enforcing criminal
laws. Cases involving non-adversarial institutions arise less frequently,
skittering around the canon’s rim. One will hear little of anything of
firefighters, welfare caseworkers, schools, or building inspectors in a
constitutional criminal procedure class where the Fourth Amendment
makes its most significant law school appearance. But those cases exist
and have often impelled the Court to modify Fourth Amendment
principles to accommodate non-adversarial state action.
A. Crime Control and the Canon
The police are the quintessential example of an adversarial public
institution because they enforce criminal law. That prerogative
contemplates coercive power, including the authority to kill
extrajudicially. 26 With that unique power comes unique dangers.

23. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 440 (1928).
24. Professor Friedman recently made this point. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 980–81.
25. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504–06 (1978) (noting that the Fourth Amendment
applies to state actors other than police, but the “paradigmatic” cases involve “entry into a private
dwelling by a law enforcement officer in search of the fruits or instrumentalities of crime”).
26. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) (recognizing the police’s authority to kill
though still subject to the limitation imposed by the Fourth Amendment).
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Justice Jackson offered the following iconic caption of the
constitutional dilemma:
The point of the Fourth Amendment . . . often is not grasped by
zealous officers . . . . Its protection consists in requiring that inferences
[regarding a crime’s occurrence] be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime . . . .27

The Fourth Amendment canon has congealed around the tension
between crime control and civil rights. 28 Opinions addressing that
tension fill case reporters: who should strike the Fourth Amendment
balance and what should the substantive balance be?
Justice Jackson purported to answer the first question: the Fourth
Amendment prefers that judges make decisions about whether to
search or seize in advance of police doing so. This illustrates the Fourth
Amendment’s preference for warrants. 29 But obtaining a warrant is
often impractical. The Court has thus created many exceptions to the
warrant requirement.30 These exceptions often require a threshold of
individualized suspicion — “reasonable suspicion” — before an officer
may detain or forcibly search individuals or their property.31
The Fourth Amendment further limits the outer bounds of
appropriate police conduct during seizures and searches.
Individualized suspicion does not, for example, authorize the police to
use excessive force against suspects, 32 perform unduly invasive
searches,33 or enter a dwelling without warning.34
The point here is not to summarize the Fourth Amendment canon,
but just to underscore its focus on the police’s adversarial role. 35
Considerably less attention is paid to non-adversarial institutions of
which the police are an ironically salient example.
27. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).
28. See RONALD ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 322 (4th ed.
2016) (noting that “Fourth Amendment litigation overwhelmingly involves” challenges to police
criminal investigations).
29. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
30. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582–83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
31. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983).
32. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
33. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (holding that the government cannot force a
defendant to have surgery to extract evidence of crime despite the existence of individualized
suspicion).
34. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590 (2006).
35. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 28, at 322.
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B. Non-Adversarial Institutions
The Fourth Amendment applies to all state agents, not just the
police. 36 But unlike the police enforcing criminal laws, welfare
caseworkers, firefighters, building code agents, and school officials do
not strike a starkly adversarial pose, at least not in the first instance.
An early example involved a Fourth Amendment challenge of welfare
case workers’ mandatory home visits for welfare recipients. 37 The
Supreme Court rejected the challenge. The Court questioned whether
the case workers’ conduct was a search at all. Even if it were, the Court
stated it was “reasonable” despite the absence of probable cause or a
warrant.38 The case worker’s job was to help aid recipients, not arrest
them, unlike what a police officer would do to a crime suspect.39 The
Court echoed the State’s gloss on the home visits as creating an
opportunity for caseworkers to better support recipients.40
Firefighters are even more clearly non-adversarial, at least during
a fire. They forcibly enter a house to save the residents and their
property, not to harm them.41 The Court accommodated a warrantless
entry into a home for firefighting purposes with a slight modification
to the existing Fourth Amendment exception of “exigency.” 42
Developed in the context of police investigations, exigency permits
warrantless entries into homes when there is probable cause that a
crime has occurred (or is about to occur) and harm to the public or
destruction of evidence likely to occur in the time it takes to obtain a
warrant.43 By eliminating the probable cause requirement, the Court
adopted the exception to serve firefighters’ emergency function: “A
burning building clearly presents an exigency” that threatens to harm
the public in the time it would take to obtain a warrant.44

36. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504–06 (1978).
37. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317–18 (1971).
38. Id. at 318.
39. Id. at 322–23. There was a debate as to how decidedly non-adversarial welfare case
workers were given their role in identifying welfare frauds. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). This
discussion is illuminating to the extent that the dissent likens the case worker to the police.
40. Id. at 314 (majority op.).
41. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294 (1988). This is not to say that relationship
between these institutions and civilians is unitarily non-adversarial. Fire department officials
sometimes investigate the causes of fire with a view toward bringing criminal charges. Id. at 290–
91. But in the main, this would seem incidental to their primary role of extinguishing fires.
42. Id. at 293.
43. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978).
44. Id.
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Once the emergency passes, things get more complicated. Fire
department officials may seek to inspect the fire-damaged property to
ascertain the causes of the fire. Their aim might be to help prevent
future fires in nearby or otherwise similar structures. But their aim
might also be to find evidence of criminal arson. Where the latter is the
driving motivation, the Supreme Court held that the fire inspector must
obtain a warrant based on probable cause just as the police would.45
This makes sense given that fire officials are performing a crime control
function. But where the fire department only seeks to understand a
blaze’s causes to prevent reoccurrence, it may do so with a lesser form
of constraint: a so-called “administrative warrant” will suffice.46
An “administrative warrant” is a judicial authorization to enter
buildings for non-criminal inspections. Such a warrant may be obtained
upon a lesser showing than what is required for a criminal warrant.47 In
Camara v. San Francisco,48 the Court justified the relaxed standard for
administrative warrants because building inspectors’ primary purpose
is non-adversarial. 49 Before Camara, the Court had read the Fourth
Amendment not to impose restrictions on building inspectors because
of their non-adversarial function. 50 In Maryland v. Frank, 51 the
Supreme Court held that city building inspectors were not subject to
the Fourth Amendment’s constraint because “[n]o evidence for
criminal prosecution [was] sought.” 52 Rather, city inspectors only
sought that defendant keeps his property “in a manner consistent with
the maintenance of minimum community standards of health and wellbeing, including his own.”53
In Camara, the Court changed course somewhat by applying the
Fourth Amendment to building inspectors, but not as stringently as to
the police. 54 The Camara Court continued to embrace the Frank
Court’s gloss on building inspections as being non-adversarial. 55 But

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Camara v. San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
48. Camara v. San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
49. Id. at 535 (“The primary governmental interest at stake is to prevent even the
unintentional development of conditions which are hazardous to public health and safety.”).
50. See Maryland v. Frank, 359 U.S. 360, 366–67 (1959).
51. Maryland v. Frank, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
52. Id. at 366.
53. Id.
54. Camara, 387 U.S. at 530–31.
55. Id.
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the Court also recognized that such inspections could become
adversarial if a citizen resisted the inspection and that such
intransigence could sometimes lead to a criminal sanction. 56
Accordingly, the Camara Court held that to enter a dwelling without
consent, building inspectors must possess a warrant based on probable
cause.57 But the Court significantly diluted the definition of probable
cause for an administrative warrant. No individualized suspicion of a
violation is required. 58 Rather, “probable cause” exists where
inspectors’ “[e]xperience [] show[s] the need for periodic inspections
of certain facilities.” without anything more.59 The lax redefinition of
probable cause in administrative search contexts reflected the Court’s
sense that building inspectors are generally non-adversarial.60
The Court’s doctrinal accommodation of non-adversarial
institutions continued with its “special needs” jurisprudence which
permits searches without individualized suspicion when conducted to
advance non-criminal state interests.61 The special needs search is an
extension of the administrative search.62 This exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s individualized suspicion and warrant requirements
arose in response to public schools’ suspicionless searches of students.63
Schools conducted such searches to, for example, detect drug use
among students. In upholding such suspicionless drug testing as a
special need, the Court took a careful note of schools’ non-adversarial
relationship with their students and the community. 64 Schools’
ostensible purpose in identifying drug use was not to initiate criminal
proceedings.65 As with administrative searches, the Court imposed less
Fourth Amendment constraint on schools’ because of their nonadversarial orientation toward the group targeted for search.

56. Id.
57. Id. at 535.
58. Id. at 537.
59. Id.
60. Id. (“[B]ecause the inspections are neither personal . . . nor aimed at the discovery of
evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen’s privacy.”).
61. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 337 (citing Camara for the balancing of interest test in special needs cases); Eve
Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 275–76 (2011).
63. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
64. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995) (noting that the reason for
suspicionless drug testing of student athletes was not to bring criminal cases against them); see
also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 621 n.5 (1989) (finding no evidence to suggest
that the reason for drug testing of the employees was to prosecute them).
65. Acton, 515 U.S. at 658; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
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II. AMBIGUOUSLY ADVERSARIAL
Despite being cast as quintessentially adversarial in the Fourth
Amendment canon,66 a substantial portion of the police’s work is nonadversarial. 67 As described in section A below, these two sets of
functions are melded together. The Court has thus extended the reach
of the relaxed Fourth Amendment standards developed in cases
involving non-adversarial institutions to the police. Examples of this
are described in section B. Finally, section C addresses the intractable
problems that arise when these more relaxed standards are applied to
the police.
A. The Catchall Tradition
The “catchall tradition” defines American policing and traces its
origins to the inception of policing in the United States. 68 In the
nineteenth century, big-city police were more likely to house itinerants
than to solve crimes. 69 Crime control is a more salient feature of
police’s responsibility and identity now than in the past.70 Police wield
coercive power of the last resort. 71 Ironically though, the police are
more often called upon to serve as the first responders for non-criminal
problems that do not require coercive power.72 This is in part because
there are few other public agencies available for health emergencies,
traffic and vehicle incidents, public and private nuisances, and a host of
other small exigencies that arise on city streets.73 In the face of trouble,
Americans tend to “call the police.”74
Caniglia illustrates the police’s catchall role. Caniglia’s spouse
called 911 following an argument in which Caniglia threatened to harm
himself with a firearm.75 The call was made after she left the house so
there was no imminent danger to her safety.76 She asked the police to

66. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) (recognizing the police’s authority to kill
though still subject to the limitation imposed by the Fourth Amendment).
67. See infra Part II.A.
68. FOGELSON, supra note 4, at 108.
69. Id.
70. SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM 135 (1977).
71. The police possess the power to use lethal force. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 1, 9.
72. MANNING, supra note 5, at 26.
73. See Supra note 5 and accompanying text.
74. EGON BITTNER, THE FUNCTIONS OF POLICE IN MODERN SOCIETY 43 (1970).
75. Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 1596 (2021).
76. Id.
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perform a “welfare check” and accompanied them. 77 Commentators
have asked whether the police are the best first responders for such
mental health crises.78 However, the call in Caniglia involved both a
mental health crisis and firearms, the combination of which raises the
possibility of criminal violence. There is often no public agency other
than the police available to respond to such possibility.79
This is not just true for mental health. Often, no one other than
the police is available to follow up on the welfare of those vulnerable
to illness or injury. 80 This can morph into a broad public-health
mandate that the police are ill-equipped to execute. For example,
Forrest Stuart’s recent work critiques therapeutic policing on Skid
Row, a poor Los Angeles neighborhood with a concentration of
rehabilitation and other social service providers. 81 “Therapeutic
policing” harnesses’ the police’s coercive power to effect “a
paternalistic brand of spatial, behavioral, and moral discipline designed
to ‘cure’ those at the bottom of the social hierarchy” through what
appear to be benevolent interventions.82 By design, the police leverage
their coercive power to compel individuals in Skid Row to seek such
services. 83 But, Stuart showed, the police also misread cues of
destitution and marginality as intransigence and personal failure.84

77. Id.
78. Friedman, supra note 5, at 980–81 (arguing that policymakers and the public should ask
whether police are appropriately tasked with various non-crime control tasks such as mental
health interventions); Stuart M. Butler & Nehath Sheriff, Innovative Solutions to Address the
Mental Health Crisis: Shifting away from Police as First Responders, BROOKINGS REP. (Nov. 23,
2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/innovative-solutions-to-address-the-mental-healthcrisis-shifting-away-from-police-as-first-responders [https://perma.cc/97JB-U7Y5] (identifying
the harmful consequences of relying on police to handle mental health interventions).
79. See Butler & Sheriff, supra note 78.
80. Id.
81. FORREST STUART, DOWN OUT & UNDER ARREST 70–71 (2016).
82. Id. at 6, 14-15, 31.
83. Id. at 97.
84. See id. at 104, 108, 109–11, 122. Skid Row’s population is extremely poor with nearly a
third living on the streets and many beset with mental health, addiction, and other issues. Id. at 2,
24. Those on Skid Row are typically there for lack of economic and social opportunities anywhere
else. See id. Ironically, those social facts, as suggested by long-term residence on Skid Row and
the attendant social connections made there, often served as salient suspicion cues. See id. 98-110.
Stuart describes how officers in Skid Row developed questionable heuristics for distinguishing
those present in the neighborhood for legitimate reasons and those that were not. For example,
those who were enrolled in residential programs at large institutional shelters were often given
passes on minor misconduct because police perceived them as trying to rehabilitate themselves
and leave Skid Row. Id. at 104, 108. Long-term residents of Skid Row who were not enrolled in
such programs were treated most harshly – the police viewed these individuals as having failed to
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The catchall tradition’s open-endedness is well illustrated by the
police’s regulation of motor vehicles. Police have enforced traffic laws
despite longstanding concerns about whether the enforcement is
sufficiently connected to the police’s crime control mission. 85 The
police are typically responsible for enforcing traffic codes, facilitating
traffic flow, responding to (and documenting) vehicle accidents, and
identifying vehicle safety issues among other issues. 86 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly noted the breadth of the police’s authority when
it comes to vehicles.87 Legislatures have piled on by heaping onto the
police the responsibility of managing non-criminal administrative
schemes on commercial vehicles and vehicle sale/salvage businesses.88
B. The Possibility of Purely Non-Adversarial Policing
The Supreme Court has correctly recognized that the police wear
adversarial and non-adversarial hats. But it has incorrectly conceived
of the police as self-consciously doffing and donning these hats in
precise response to different kinds of problems. The line between
adversarial and non-adversarial policing is murky.
The Court has accommodated the police’s non-adversarial
function by applying a more relaxed Fourth Amendment standard to
those functions. For example, the police may enter private homes on a
showing less than probable cause if the purpose is “tono render
emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant
from imminent injury.” 89 The police may search unattended and
impounded vehicles upon an even lesser showing. In South Dakota v.
Opperman, 90 the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment

rehabilitate themselves and thus choosing to indulge in the degenerate lifestyle that police
associated with the neighborhood. Id. at 106–07, 109–10, 122.
85. FOGELSON, supra note 4, at 185; Friedman, supra note 5, at 954.
86. FOGELSON, supra note 4, at 185; Friedman, supra note 5, at 954.
87. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (“One has a lesser expectation of
privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation . . . . A car has little capacity for
escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where its occupants and its contents are
in plain view.”); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (noting the police’s role in
implementing “the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic”).
88. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 694–95 & n.1 (1987) (describing the New York
statute that required junkyards to maintain records for vehicles coming into their possession and
to make those records available to police officers); United States v. Orozco, 858 F.3d 1204, 1206
(9th Cir. 2017) (describing Nevada statute authorizing inspection of commercial vehicles).
89. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
90. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
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permitted suspicionless “inventory searches” of impounded vehicles.91
This was, in part, because the search’s purpose was to protect the car
owner’s property and promote community safety, not to investigate
crimes. 92 Three years earlier in Cady v. Dombrowski, 93 the Court
permitted the police to search an unattended vehicle without a warrant
or probable cause pursuant to the police’s “community caretaking”
responsibilities.94 The State in Caniglia sought to import this seemingly
broad exception to home searches.
The Caniglia Court declined to import this seemingly more
expansive “community caretaking exception” into the home search
context. 95 It was not entirely clear whether the “community
caretaking” standard was more permissive than the “emergency aid”
standard announced in Brigham City v. Stuart. 96 Both emphasize
reasonableness in lieu of the canonical requirements of a warrant or
individualized suspicion.97 In Caniglia, concurring Justices took pains
to emphasize the police’s unimpeded authority to forcibly enter homes
to provide emergency aid.98
The facts in Stuart illustrate why the catchall tradition muddies the
distinction between the police’s adversarial and non-adversarial roles.
In Stuart, the police sought to provide emergency aid to teenagers the
police observed to be in a fight.99 Their observation also constituted
evidence of crime and the police accordingly arrested Stuart,
illustrating how the police’s adversarial and non-adversarial
motivations were mixed all along. But even if the police are completely
non-adversarial at the onset of an encounter, things can change
quickly. The police are not expected to avert their eyes from evidence
of a crime after having entered a space to provide emergency aid.100
91. Id. at 370.
92. Id. at 369.
93. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
94. Id. at 441.
95. See Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 1600 (2021).
96. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
97. See Caniglia, 141 S. Ct. at 1600 (holding that although the “community caretaking” rule
may allow warrantless searching, “[w]hat is reasonable for vehicles is different from what is
reasonable for homes”); Brigham, 547 U.S. at 403 (“Accordingly, law enforcement officers may
enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to
protect an occupant from imminent injury.”).
98. See supra note 20 (summarizing concurring opinions).
99. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
100. The “plain view” doctrine allows the police to seize evidence of crime that they observe
while being lawfully present. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134–35 (1990). The police’s
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The muddling of adversarial and non-adversarial functions can
also be seen in special needs and administrative cases involving the
police. The Supreme Court has authorized the police to conduct
suspicionless traffic enforcement at fixed checkpoints under the rubric
of special needs — an exception developed in the context of nonadversarial institutions. 101 For example, in Sitz v. Michigan, 102 the
Supreme Court concluded that a suspicionless DUI checkpoint is
permissible under the Fourth Amendment.103 The Court reasoned that
such a checkpoint is designed to keep roadways safe for all motorists
by reducing drunk driving. 104 Of course, the Michigan State Patrol
advanced this interest by enforcing the criminal prohibition on drunk
driving. 105 There was no way to disentangle the State Patrol’s
adversarial and non-adversarial functions.
Legislatures have contributed to the mess: heaping onto the
police’s to-do list is easier than creating a new regulatory capacity.106
Police thus find themselves responsible for implementing regulatory
schemes that are not per se criminal. For example, in New York v.
Burger, 107 the Court considered a legislative scheme authorizing the
police to conduct warrantless checks on junkyards to deter auto
thefts. 108 The Court concluded that the search in Burger was
administrative, not criminal. 109 But distinguishing criminal from
administrative purposes seems quixotic, since the criminal law’s
ostensible purpose was also to deter auto thefts.110 Just as in Stuart, the
police were free to use evidence seized in the administrative search in
the criminal case against Burger.111

discovery of the evidence need not be inadvertent for the plain view doctrine to apply, so long as
they have a lawful basis for entering the home (whether to provide the “emergency aid” or
otherwise). Id.
101. Supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text.
102. Sitz v. Michigan, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
103. Id. at 447.
104. Id. at 449–51.
105. Id.
106. Cf. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE 43–44 (2010) (suggesting that Congress
creates rights for private litigation to vindicate public harms because of political hurdles that
frustrate creation of new regulatory authorities).
107. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
108. See id. at 698.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 724 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 712 (majority op.).
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Burger rightly argued that the police would inevitably flex their
adversarial crime-control muscle under the cover of New York’s
administrative scheme.112 The legislation authorized the police to do
exactly that.113 But the Court rejected the objection, noting that the
only way of solving the problem would be to require the State to use
an institution other than the police to enforce administrative
schemes. 114 The Court shuddered at the prospect of constitutionally
compelling New York to do that.115
C. Pretext and Pathology
The Supreme Court has noted that the intermingling of
adversarial and non-adversarial functions creates constitutionally
worrisome opportunities for pretextual police behavior.116 The Court
has however, offered little to check such behaviors, and likely cannot
do more given how deeply entrenched the catchall tradition is. The
tradition makes it impossible for the police officers to set aside their
adversarial orientation when pursuing non-adversarial ends. The
police derive their status and authority from the idea that their core
mission of enforcing criminal law. That status and authority undergird
the police’s occupational common sense and enable them to “nonnegotiably” resolve problems on the streets, whether criminal or not.117
The police’s coercive power is, in other words, structurally overleveraged. This structural feature of American policing is not readily
susceptible to judicial reform.
The Court has recognized that relaxing the Fourth Amendment
requirements for non-adversarial police functions creates the risk that
the police will invoke those functions as a cover for doing criminal
investigations without sufficient justification. 118 The Court has thus
112. Id. at 718.
113. Brief for Respondent, Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 1987 WL 881368, at *15-17.
114. Burger, 482 U.S. at 717.
115. Id. at 718.
116. See, e.g., id. at 716 & n.27 (“[T]he New York Legislature had proper regulatory purposes
for enacting the administrative scheme and was not using it as a ‘pretext’ to enable law
enforcement authorities to gather evidence of penal law violations.”); South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976); see also Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., concurring). In the context of its “special needs” jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
has stated that courts must ensure that a program or policy’s actual programmatic purpose is
something other than advancing crime control objectives. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531
U.S. 32, 45–47 (2000). This implies that the pretextual analysis may be permissible in such cases.
117. See BITTNER, supra note 74, at 42 and accompanying text.
118. Supra note 116.
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hinted that a pretextual search or seizure may sometimes raise a Fourth
Amendment issue. 119 But how are courts supposed to ascertain
whether the police’s proffered justifications are indeed pretextual?
There may be rare instances where a police department’s modus
operandi makes it obvious that the administrative, special needs, or
other non-adversarial rationales for the search/seizure were pretextual.
For example, dispatching a SWAT team to conduct an administrative
search tends to suggest that the rationale was a pretext. 120 Perhaps
using a specialized narcotics interdiction unit to conduct welfare checks
would similarly suggest that the latter rationale was a ruse. More
commonly, claims of pretextual policing will involve individual
officers’ choices in specific situations. Yet, the Court has forbidden a
judicial inquiry into an officer’s underlying motivations.121
The Court has held that Fourth Amendment analysis must focus
on the “objective” bases for an officers’ search or seizure.122 This means
that so long as the police can retrospectively point to some objective
facts justifying police’s conduct under the Fourth Amendment, the
conduct is justified with little regard for the police’s actual
motivations.123 The more rationales available to the police, the easier it
becomes to strategically recast past conduct in constitutionally
permissible terms. The objective approach enables pretextual police
behavior. 124 Even if the police readily admit to a pretextual stop or
search, there might not be a Fourth Amendment violation provided the
police can point to other facts that justified it.125 But there will usually
be no practical utility for the police to admit pretext. Their incentive
will be to articulate only those facts (and legal rationales) that justify
their behavior in the field.
The Supreme Court’s refusal to authorize more robust review of
police pretext is driven by practical concerns. More robust review
119. See id. (listing cases in which the Supreme Court permitted pretextual analysis).
120. See WBY, Inc. v. Dekalb Cnty., 766 F. App’x 852, 855 (11th Cir. 2019) (finding that the
use of the SWAT team creates a factual issue as to whether police’s investigation of the adult
entertainment club was “criminal” or “administrative”); Bruce v. Beary, 498 F.3d 1232, 1243 (11th
Cir. 2007) (concluding the same for the SWAT team’s search of the auto body shop).
121. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814–15 (1996) (holding that the court should
make objective analysis).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE §§ 1.4(f), 3.2(b) (6th ed. 2021).
125. See United States v. Orozco, 858 F.3d 1204, 1213 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that where
there are dual motives, one permissible and one impermissible, for a stop, the stop is
constitutional so long as the stop would not have occurred absent the impermissible motive).
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would require courts to spend time and energy probing officers’
subjective motivations during suppression hearings. 126 There would
likely be little payoff for this effort because the catchall tradition
provides such broad cover for police pretext. Absent a mistake or
guilelessness, police officers need not admit that they behaved
pretextually. Enabling robust judicial inquiries into police pretext is
likely to do little more than underscore courts’ limited supervisory
power over the police.
Related, the idea of “pretext” understates the catchall tradition’s
biggest problem. Pretext presupposes that officers are impelled by
tidily unitary legal impulses. They either seek to investigate a crime or
perform an administrative search. This framing focuses attention on
officers’ veracity, which assumes that they have contemporaneous
awareness of whether their motivation is adversarial or not. That is not
always true.
The catchall tradition thrusts patrol officers into the “fluid whole
of peoples’ lives.”127 Patrol officers do not consciously switch between
their adversarial and non-adversarial hats in response to an unfolding
situation. The police’s job is to resolve whatever situational dilemmas
they confront. Sometimes an arrest emerges as the answer, but that
may not be obvious at the onset of the encounter. The precise contours
of a resolution will typically develop as the encounter unfolds. Egon
Bittner noted that it is officers’ situational intuitions that are most
important here, not law or any other formal rules.128
For example, we might return to the Caniglia facts and speculate
on what the officers might have done under various counterfactuals.
The officers resolved that call by sending Caniglia off for a psychiatric
evaluation and seizing his guns.129 One can imagine slightly different
scenarios in which the police might have arrested Caniglia for a crime.
If Caniglia had been obstreperous or challenged the police’s authority,
he might have been arrested for an obstruction of justice type crime.
Had it emerged that Caniglia’s firearms were illegally possessed or that
126. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 815 (questioning whether police’s motives can be practically
assessed by a judge after the fact).
127. EDWARD CONLON, BLUE BLOOD 158 (2004).
128. Bittner’s iconic formulation of the patrol officer’s function is as follows: “[T]he role of
the police is best understood as a mechanism for the distribution of non-negotiably coercive force
employed in accordance with the dictates of an intuitive grasp of situational exigencies.”
BITTNER, supra note 74, at 46.
129. Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 1598 (2021) (noting that Caniglia went to hospital
voluntarily).
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he had some other contraband in plain sight when the police arrived,
Caniglia might also have been arrested.
There is also a deeper and structural level at which distinguishing
between adversarial and non-adversarial policing is untenable. Even
though the police’s response to most problems is not in the form of an
arrest or physical force, the police are always symbolically (if not
materially) leveraging that adversarial capacity when solving
problems. 130 Bittner thus described the police as wielding coercive
power to deal with “situational exigencies,” not necessarily to solve a
crime as conventionally thought.131 The police’s status and authority
are denominated in terms of the adversarial power associated with the
enforcement of criminal law. The police do not set aside this power
when they are performing functions that do not call for its immediate
exercise. They do not set aside their badges, uniforms, and firearms –
all of which are supposed to communicate adversarial power – when
called upon to perform non-adversarial tasks.
Police’s occupational norms cultivate suspiciousness and an
adversarial orientation toward the world.132 Criminologists suggest that
this trait is inculcated through police training and practice,133 and over
time, becomes a reflex akin to a “sixth sense.”134 This orientation may
lead police officers to respond more aggressively to, for example, those
experiencing mental health crises, than professionals with a
therapeutic orientation. Disability rights advocates have, for example,
urged building a greater capacity for non-police responses for mental
health calls.135 Forest Stuart has detailed the unintended consequences
of relying on the police to advance therapeutic goals.136 He found that
the police’s deeply entrenched adversarial norms shot through their
ostensibly non-adversarial mission in Skid Row. 137 Officers directed
the harshest treatment to those whom officers perceived (often
incorrectly) to lack self-improvement gusto.138

130. See STUART, supra note 81, at 109–11.
131. BITTNER, supra note 74, at 46.
132. JOHN P. CRANK, UNDERSTANDING POLICE CULTURE 145 (2d ed. 2004) (summarizing
literature on suspicion as an occupational trait among the police).
133. Id. at 147–48.
134. Id. at 150–52.
135. Morgan, supra note 6, at 1464.
136. STUART, supra note 81 at 70–71 and accompanying text.
137. See id. at 89, 92, 254.
138. Id. at 104, 109–11.
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The catchall tradition fuses the adversarial power with nonadversarial functions in ways that cannot be teased apart for street
policing.
IV. ADVERSARIAL POLICING REDUX
The discussion above describes how the catchall tradition
leverages the police’s coercive power to provide a broad range of
services that do not call for that power’s use. The catchall tradition
means that civilians are exposed to that coercive power as a condition
for receiving the benefit of the police’s non-adversarial work. Civilians
are, in other words, overexposed to the police’s coercive power. This
would be problematic even if that overexposure was distributed evenly.
But it is not. The poor and people of color are relatively more exposed
to it and the negative consequences of policing generally. The
constitutional critique of the catchall tradition offered above thus
intersects with ongoing criticism of policing’s racial harshness.139
The messy and indiscriminate melding of adversarial power with
non-adversarial functions adds to the list of reasons policymakers
should rethink and remake American policing. Our constitutional ideal
of judicially supervised policing is inconsistent with the catchall
tradition. It makes intuitive sense that constitutional scrutiny’s
intensity would vary in relation to the coercive power a state institution
wields. But a scheme of graduated review can only work if state
institutions have focused ends and limited means of accomplishing
those ends. The catchall tradition means that the police’s ends are
undefined and that their means are left to officers’ street wiles and
practical intuitions. 140 Courts cannot be expected to distinguish
between adversarial and non-adversarial police functions after-the-fact
when patrol officers cannot do so contemporaneously.

139. The critical literature on race and policing has become significant richer and more
nuanced in recent years. See, e.g., Stewart Chang, Frank Rudy Cooper, Addie C. Rohlik, Race
And Gender And Policing, 21 NEV. L. J. 885, 888 (2021) (linking individual police killings to
broader critique of how race and gender categories are constituted); Eric Miller, Knowing Your
Place, The Police Role In Reproduction Of Racial Hierarchy, 89 G.W. L. REV. 1607, 1614–15
(2021) (arguing that police harshness reflects civility norms that both underwrite and are
underwritten by racial hierarchy); Frank Rudy Cooper, Intersectionality, Police Excessive Force,
and Class, 89 G.W. L. REV. 1452, 1452 (2021) (arguing that race and class interact to produce
harsh policing); Eldar Haber, Racial Recognition, 43 CARDOZO L. REV. 71, 94–102 (2021)
(identifying how police's use of recognition technology inures to disadvantage of Black people).
140. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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Calling for the dismantling of the catchall tradition is tantamount
to calling for a dramatic remaking of municipal police. This is an
ambitious reform trajectory but should not be understood in radical
abolitionist terms.141 Rather, remaking the police in a more decisively
adversarial mold would help realize the vision of police that has been
at the center of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. That vision of a
crime-control focused institution is also consistent with how both the
police officers themselves and the public view policing.142
The Court’s accommodation of catchall policing is not simply an
ideological maneuver. It reflects the limits of judicial power to
supervise catchall policing. This is a structural problem not amenable
to a neat doctrinal refinement and implicates the serious practical
challenges that confront municipal and state governments in remaking
the police.
Remaking the police in the mold of an adversarial institution
requires more than just remaking the police. It requires remaking
municipal government. The catchall tradition allowslegislatures to
avoid thinking systematically about the range of exigencies that call for
non-adversarial responses and those that do not. The catchall tradition
makes the police a rump institution, responsible for addressing all
unhappy problems that the body politic would rather close its eyes to.
Some jurisdictions have begun to make reforms in the direction
suggested here. The most notable reforms have involved some
jurisdictions substituting or pairing trained mental health professionals
with the police for some calls. 143 More ambitious proposals have
included creating new, non-adversarial institutions for handling traffic,
mental health, and other public welfare functions while leaving the
core criminal law enforcement functions in the hands of the police
department. Reconfiguring municipal services in this way confronts
any number of practical state law challenges. 144 Police would likely
oppose such reforms if they entail a diminution in the operating budget
or political influence. Whether sufficient political will exists within
communities to sustain a meaningful revamping of municipal services
141. See Jessica M. Eaglin, To “Defund” The Police, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 120, 133–34
(2021) (noting that the “defund” rhetoric may be consistent with “managerialist” cost reducing
reforms).
142. See Van Maanen, supra note 5, at 42–43; BITTNER, supra note 74, at 2, 42.
143. See Stuart M. Butler & Nehath Sheriff, supra note 78.
144. These challenges are hardly trivial and have been documented by Anthony O’Rourke
et al., Disbanding Police Agencies, 121 COLUM. L. REV 1327, 1359–86 (describing state and local
law terrain that militates against limiting or eliminating police and sheriff’s departments as they
currently exist).
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remains to be seen. But such revamping is a prerequisite for
meaningful constitutional restraint upon the police.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment distinguishes between adversarial and
non-adversarial State functions. Individuals need greater protection
from the State when it seems to harm rather than help. The catchall
tradition in American policing is inconsistent with this basic premise.
Because of the haphazard fusing of non-adversarial and adversarial
functions, American police are invested with a level of coercion not
required for many of the tasks that they perform. The catchall tradition
makes it difficult if not impossible to distinguish between police
officers’ adversarial and non-adversarial acts. There is no judicially
crafted doctrinal solution for this problem. Policymakers and
legislatures should therefore rethink and reform police departments’
structure and mandate.

